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Abstract
This paper describes a survey of normative agent-based social simulation models. These models
are examined from the perspective of the foundations of social theory. Agent-based modelling
contributes to the research program of methodological individualism. Norms are a central concept
in the role theoretic concept of action in the tradition of Durkheim and Parsons. This paper
investigates to what extend normative agent-based models are able to capture the role theoretic
concept of norms. Three methodological core problems are identified: the question of norm
transmission, normative transformation of agents and what kind of analysis the models contribute.
It can be shown that initially the models appeared only to address some of these problems rather
than all of them simultaneously. More recent developments, however, show progress in that
direction. However, the degree of resolution of intra agent processes remains too low for a
comprehensive understanding of normative behaviour regulation.
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 Introduction
1.1
The past decade(s) have witnessed a growing interest in the inclusion of norms in multi-agent
simulation models. Numerous factors are responsible for attention being paid to norms, ranging
from technical problems with moving robots (Shoham and Tennenholtz 1992; Boman 1999) to
philosophical interest in the foundation of morality (Axelrod 1986; Skyrms 1996, 2004). So far,
the investigation of normative multi-agent systems is a highly diverse field of research. Therefore
an overview of agent-based social simulation models that exist so far might provide insight into
converging or diverging trends in the conceptual realisation of normative agents as well as
shedding light on whether and how particular attempts might benefit from the findings of other
research fields.1.2
The questions directed towards normative agent-based social simulation models in this survey
originate in a distinct point of view: namely, they are posed from the perspective of the
foundations of sociology. The rationale for choosing this perspective is that the notion of norms is
a central concept in classical role theory of mid-twentieth century sociology (Parsons 1937;
Parsons and Shils 1951; Merton 1957). Role theory claims that action is guided by a normative
orientation. This theory of action is often paraphrased as the 'homo sociologicus'. For a long time
this remained the dominant stream of sociological theory. Thus, normative agent-based social
simulation do in fact address the questions of this old approach to the foundations of sociology: the
normative orientation of actors. For this reason it will be asked whether these models are able to
capture the methodological principles of this account.
1.3
However, in the past 20 years, this paradigm has been heavily criticised[1]: Role theory built on
the old claim that social phenomena should be explained with social factors (Durkheim 1895).
Roles are a pre-given element in this theoretical architecture. Roles (and thus: norms) emanate
from society. However, the origin of both roles and society is left unexplained. It has been
suspected that this is a reification of society. Others have suggested building sociology on the
foundations of individual actors. This is the programme of the so-called methodological
individualism (Boudon 1981; Raub and Voss 1981; Coleman 1990; Esser 1993). A shift 'from
factors to actors' (Macy and Willer 2002) can be observed in the foundations of sociology. Agent-
based models contribute to this theory building strategy: in agent-based simulation models
(Artificial Societies), structures emerge from individual interaction. The great advantage of this
methodology is that it enables the investigation of the feedback loop between individual interaction
and collective dynamics. This has led to a growing awareness of its potential for investigating the
building-blocks of social structure. For instance, it is even claimed that agent-based simulation
allows us to "discover the language in which the great book of social reality is written" (Deffuant
et al. 2006).
1.4
Nevertheless, the problem how to explain normative orientation still remains. Hence, to include
norms in agent-based models would enable to recover the findings of role theory in terms of
individual actors; in fact, it would represent a great advance for the foundations of sociological
theory.
1.5
To examine how far this project has been already developed, this paper proceeds as follows:
1.6
First, the questions that need to be addressed to normative agents from the perspective of
sociological role theory will be developed. To focus the investigation on methodological issues,
these questions concentrate on the methodological characteristics of the role theoretic norm
conception. This section contains two parts: In the first, a brief outline of the role theoretical
concept of norms will be given (Section 2). It will be briefly outlined (Section 3) why and how
normative agent-based models might contribute to discovering the language of social reality from
the perspective of sociological critics of classical role theory.
1.7
The main part of this paper consists of a review of existing simulation models, which is organised
as follows: Two classical papers, representing two typical approaches, are considered in more
detail. The strength and weakness of both approaches will be elaborated (Section 4 — 5). Then a
short overview of further developments will be given (Section 6). Two exemplary models of both
traditions will be examined in more detail, again with the aim of answering the question: can a
convergence of both traditions be observed, and how, if at all, does this contribute to an actor-oriented reconstruction of normatively framed social roles?
Development of questions to normative agent-based models
2.1
In this section the questions will be developed that need to be posed to normative muti-agent
models from the perspective of sociological theory. To specify where norms are placed in the
theoretical architecture, let us consider the example of the famous Mr Smith, introduced by Ralf
Dahrendorf (1956, pp. 19 ff.) in his analysis of the 'homo sociologicus' to characterise key
elements of sociological role theory. We first meet him at a cocktail party and want to learn more
about him. What is there to find out?
2.2
Mr Smith is an adult male, circa 35 years old. He holds a PhD, and is an academic. Since he wears
a wedding ring, we know that he is married. He lives in a middle-sized town in Germany and is a
German citizen. Moreover, we discover that he is Protestant and that he arrived as a refugee after
the 2nd World War in a town populated mostly by Catholics. We are told that this situation caused
some difficulties for him. His is a Lecturer by profession and he has two kids. Finally, we learn
that he is the third chairmen of the local section of a political party, Y, a passionate and skilful
card player and a similarly passionate though not so good driver. This approximates to what his
friends would tell us.
2.3
In fact, we may have the feeling that we know him rather better now. After all, we have some
expectations as to how a lecturer is likely to behave. As a lecturer he stands in certain relations to
colleagues and pupils. As a father he will love and care for his children, and card playing is also
typically associated with certain habits. If we know the party Y, we will know a lot more about his
political values. However, all that we have found out represent social facts. There are a lot more
lecturers, fathers and German citizens beside Mr Smith. In fact, none of this information tell us
anything about the unique identity of Mr Smith. We simply discovered information about social
positions, which can, of course, be occupied by varying persons. However, social positions are
associated with specific social roles. Roles are defined by specific attributes, behaviour and social
relations. Demands of society determine—to a certain degree—individual behaviour. Individuals
are faced with obligations and expectations. This social demand is transmitted to the individual by
norms. Norms are the 'casting mould' (Durkheim 1895) of individual action. They regulate how
lecturers, fathers and members of political parties should act to fulfil the role expectations of
society. In particular, Talcott Parsons (1937) emphasised that the ends of individual actions are not
arbitrary, but rather are prescribed by social norms. Thus, norms represent a key concept within
sociological role theory.
2.4
Moreover, Dahrendorf presumes that Mr Smith will undertake a considerable part of the education
of his pupils without recourse to the cane. Presumably, nowadays we will be unlikely to find
references to such educational practices. Likewise, it is improbable that we will be told anything
about driving competence. Thus, we have learned another lesson: Norms may change over the
course of time.
2.5
To examine the explanatory account of this theoretical approach, the present investigation will
abstract from a description of the content of concrete norms. We concentrate on the
methodological characteristics of norms in general, rather than the content of specific norms. On
closer inspection of this example, we find out that the concept of social norms is characterised by
three key elements:First, norms show some degree of generality. They are regarded as the 'casting mould' of
individual action (Durkheim 1895). The very idea of role theory is that a social role must not
be restricted to a unique individual. For instance, the roles of lecturer or chairman of a
political party can be performed by different individuals. It might not, of course, be arbitrary
as to who will play this role. In fact, it is a major focus of the empirical counterpart of role
theory, statistical analysis of variables, to investigate the distribution of roles. For instance,
monetary background might determine an individual's chances of securing an academic
position. Nevertheless, academic positions are a feature of society, not the individual. In the
classical account, the generality of norms is simply a given. However, agent-based models
start from individual agents. Thus, in the individualistic approach norms have to spread in
some way from one agent to another to gain generality. The explanation of norm spreading
is essential for a reconstruction of social norms in terms of individual actors.
Secondly, the role set of father or lecturer encompasses a huge action repertoire. The choice
of a concrete action cannot be determined only solely by an external force. The ends of an
action have to be determined internally by the individual actor executing a specific role. For
instance, the norms to love and take care of his children have to be an internalised property
of a father. Thus, a role also possesses a subjective element. It has already been highlighted
by Durkheim (1903 [1973]) that the internalisation of norms constitutes a crucial element of
the education process.
Thirdly, this approach is characterised by a certain type of analysis: the normative
integration of society (Parsons 1937; Davies and Moore 1945; Merton 1957). Hence, the
question is to a lesser extent concerned with the origin of norms than with the function of
norms for a society. For instance, the role of the father is to educate his child. The role of the
lecturer is crucial for the socialisation of pupils. Thus, both roles are functionally relevant for
the reproduction of the society.
Criticism of role theory
3.1
However, classical role theory has been severely criticised in the past decade. It is not the purpose
of this article to provide a comprehensive review of this debate.[2] However, two points shall be
highlighted that are relevant for normative multi-agent systems:
First, the norm conception of role theory has only a quite dubious epistemological basis. For
Durkheim as well as for Parsons, society is a reality 'sui generis' (Balog 2000). Both authors
did not pay much attention to the question of the origins of society. Thus, the focus of this
approach is on a functional rather than on a causal analysis. This has been criticised as a
reification of society (compare Gellner 1971; Archer 1995).
Secondly, role theory has been criticised for sketching an oversocialised picture of man
(Wrong 1961). Already in the 1960s, Homans (1964) claimed to 'bring man back in'. In fact,
individual actors in role theory are more or less social automata.[3] If they have properly
internalised the norms, they execute the program prescribed by their roles (Balog 2000).
3.2
Agent-based social simulation contributes to a better comprehension of these two problems. First,
with this methodology, it is possible to generate macrosocial structures through individual
interaction. It enables a causal understanding of the processes at work. Hence, normative agent-
based models can provide a sound basis for the origins of a macrosocial structure like social
norms. Also the second problem can also be addressed with agent-based models. Since structures
on the macro level are a product of individual interaction, it seems possible to fill the gap between
individual action and social structure with agent-based models. Hence, agent-based modelling
suggests to contribute to some essential questions that are related to the question of the origin of
society. Yet the question remains whether these are also able to rediscover the findings and resultsof the role theoretic approach. Therefore they should capture the above mentioned properties of the
social roles; that is, some answer need to be given to the following questions:
1.  Can they provide insights into the normative regulation of society; that is, do they also
reproduce the findings of a functional analysis of norms (focus of contribution)?
Moreover, do they allow for a causal reconstruction of the mechanisms that generate the functional
interconnectedness on the social level? This implies that two further questions have to be
addressed:
2.  What transforms the agents in such a way that they factually follow norms? That is, what are
the causal mechanisms at work that enable an internalisation of norms (transformation
problem)?
3.  By what mechanisms in the model can norm-abiding behaviour spread to or decay from one
agent to another (transmission problem)?
Literature review
4.1
These questions will be examined in this section. Again, it has to be emphasised that the
investigation concentrates on methodology, not on the contents of norms governing concrete roles
such as father or lecturer. However, existing models are clustered around various intuitions about
norms, conventions or standards of behaviour. The concrete research question differs from model
to model. Some models concentrate on the emergence or spreading of norms. Others concentrate
on functional aspects or the feedback of norms on individual agent's behaviour. A multiplicity of
concepts is at hand. Hence, a comprehensive review of all models and accounts that may be in
some way related to the study of norms would go beyond the scope of this investigation.
4.2
Instead, the report concentrates on a more specific sample. It focus on agent-based simulation
models possessing certain characteristics: in some way both intra -and inter-agents processes need
to be involved in the model. While the notion of inter-agent processes refers to a population of
interacting agents, the notion of intra-agent processes indicates that the agents cannot not be purely
reactive: some internal processes should be at work.[4] These processes have to be of such a kind
that—in a broad and liberal sense—they provide insights into normative behaviour regulation
and/or transformation.
4.3
The overwhelming mass of the research so characterised can be traced back to (or is at least
influenced by) two traditions in particular: first, game theory and secondly an architecture of
cognitive agents with some roots in Artificial Intelligence. Tradition and theoretical background
has a direct impact on the terminology used. Depending on their background, the models tend to
be communicated in different scientific communities. Additionally, references in articles tend to
depend on their authors' background. For instance, five out of seven papers attributed to the AI
tradition mention a more technical paper of Shoham and Tennenholtz (1992). This
acknowledgement is predominantly enacted in the introductory notes, where one usually indicates
the research field to which a paper is intended to contribute. Under the perspective of content, the
models in the AI tradition typically contain references to conceptual articles relating to agent
architectures. Articles with models in a more game theoretical tradition typically refer to game
theoretic literature for the characterisation of the interaction structures in which the authors are
interested.
4.4
Of course, this tradition-influenced framing, publishing and referencing is a tendency. It does notconstitute a clear-cut disjunction without any intersection. It has to be emphasised that this is
neither a very precise nor a disjunctive categorisation. To some degree, the distinction between
game theory and DAI is a distinction in the mode of speech employed by the authors. Some
problems of game theoretic models could also be formulated in a DAI language and vice versa.
The categorisation of models as following the DAI tradition shall only indicate that the agents
employed by these models are in some way cognitively richer than those in the so-called game
theoretic models.
4.5
Nevertheless, this distinction gives a rough sketch of the line of thought followed by the models,
and also of the kind of problems, the concepts for their investigation, and the mode of speech in
which the paper is presented. Moreover, this categorisation provide hints to other areas of research
that are closely related to the models considered in this article: For instance, simulation is only a
small sub-discipline of game theory in general and the distinction between analytical and
simulation results is only gradual[5]. Simulation models might describe problems in game theoretic
terms, but the method of resolution is not that of analytical game theory (Binmore 1998). In fact,
investigating norms with the means of analytical game theory is a highly active research field.
Also research on norms in the Artificial Intelligence tradition is by far not restricted to simulation
experiments. For instance, important contributions can be found in more conceptually oriented
considerations, often closely related to deontic logic (Boella et al. 2007). A number of
contributions focus on the proper design of normative architectures[6]. A comprehensive review of
all these approaches would soon exceed the scope of a single article. Identifying these two
traditions enables to characterise the target of this review as a small, but important intersection of
these two traditions: it concentrates on such accounts that describe results of simulation
experiments. The particular focus of this review is an investigation of the contribution of
simulation experiments to sociological theory.
4.6
The following considerations will be centred around the outlined distinction. First a closer
inspection of the classical accounts will be undertaken. These models are selected because of their
high impact on further research. How far do they proceed with regard to the questions outlined in
the previous section? Does the difference in the theoretical tradition affect the models?
4.7
Subsequently, the models following these lines of tradition are taken under investigation from a
broader comparative point of view: it will turn out that, in fact, converging trends can be observed.
Therefore, a closer inspection of two models of both traditions will be undertaken. These are not
selected because of their impact but because they can be regarded as striking examples of more
elaborated accounts to integrate the frame of the other research tradition into the model. This will
enable an evaluation inasmuch normative agent-based models have so far reached the goal to
discover 'the language in which social reality is written'.
The beginnings
5.1
First, a more detailed description of the classical articles of these modelling traditions is given,
each followed by an analysis of their strength and weakness with respect to the 'homo
sociologicus' conception of norms. It has to be emphasised that it need not be the intention of the
author to reconstruct a specific sociological theory. Some authors explicitly address those
questions, others not. Some authors are only interested in explaining the emergence or function of
norms without reference to any social theory. However, it is an implicit property of simulation
models of norms that they provide building-blocks to rediscover role theoretical arguments and
insights from an actor oriented perspective.5.2
The classical paper in the game theoretic tradition is Robert Axelrod's 'an evolutionary approach to
norms' of 1986. It has been analysed and replicated several times (e.g. Deguchi 2001; Galan and
Izquierdo 2005), and remains the point of reference for this line of tradition. The classical model in
the tradition of models employing cognitive rich agents is the model described in Conte and
Castelfranchi's 1995 paper on 'Understanding the functions of norms in social groups through
simulation'. This model has also been replicated several times (Conte, Castelfranchi and Paolucci
1998; Saam and Harrer 1999; Staller and Petta 2001; Hales 2002). It has been extended in several
ways and is still the reference point for authors in this tradition.
1) Robert Axelrod: An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review,
Vol. 80, 1986
5.3
In this paper simulation models of a norms game and a meta-norms game are described. Axelrod
defines the existence of a norm as the extent to which individuals usually act in a certain way and
are often punished when seen not be acting in this way.
5.4
To analyse possible mechanisms of how norms develop and change over time an evolutionary
approach is utilised. It does not rely on the assumption of rationality, but on the assumption that
effective strategies are more likely to be retained than ineffective ones. This is interpreted as a
form of social learning.
5.5
The norms game works in the following manner:
At the beginning, an individual player has the options to defect (e.g. by cheating in an exam) or
not defect. This is accompanied by a certain chance of being observed by other players. The
defector receives a certain payoff, while all other players are slightly hurt. Yet, if player j observes
the defection of player i, player j can decide to punish (or not to punish) player i. In the case of
punishment, player i gets a negative payoff. However, player j has to pay an enforcement cost. The
choice of the strategies is dependent on two variables: the boldness Bi, which determines the
probability that player i will defect, and the vengefulness Vi , which determines the probability that
player i will punish defectors.
5.6
The simulation proceeds as follows:
The agent population consists of 20 players. Their initial strategy is set at random. Each individual
gets four opportunities to defect with a randomly determined probability of being observed. Then
the reproduction rate of the players is determined: an individual with a score one standard
deviation above the average gets two offspring, an individual with average success gets one
offspring, and an individual with a score one standard deviation below the average gets no
offspring. These steps are repeated for 100 generations. 5 simulation runs are executed.
5.7
The result of the norms game is ambiguous:
One run resulted in a high degree of vengefulness and a low degree of boldness. However, two
runs resulted in a moderate level of both boldness and vengefulness, while a further two runs
arrived at a state of almost no vengefulness combined with a high degree of boldness.
5.8As it is in fact verified by Galan and Izquierdo (2005), Axelrod assumes that these different
outcomes are due to one common mechanism: at first, the boldness level starts to decrease because
of the costs of being punished. Thus, the rate of defection decreases. However, this leads to a
decrease in the level of vengefulness, because punishment is also costly. This in turn makes it
attractive to defect again. Thus, the final stable state is a state without any norms at all.
5.9
This result raises the question of how the establishment of norms is possible. Axelrod proposes a
second mechanism called meta-norms: punish those who do not punish defectors.
5.10
The game proceeds like the norms game, yet a further step is introduced: As in the norms game,
agent i has the choice to defect or not-defect. If agent j observes a defection it has the choice of
punishing or not punishing agent i. However, if agent j decides not to punish, it can be observed
with a certain probability by agent z. Now a further step is introduced: agent z can decide to
punish (or not to punish) agent j for not punishing agent i. The probability for punishment is
determined by the degree of vengefulness of agent z.
5.11
The result of the simulation is unambiguous:[7]
5.12
All runs resulted in a high degree of vengefulness and a degree of boldness near to zero. Thus, a
norm against defection has been established. The mechanism behind this result is that the players
have a strong incentive to be vengeful, simply to avoid punishment.
Axelrod's contribution to answering the questions:
5.13
The agents in the model are very flexible in term of changing their behaviour. Thus, a
transformation of the agents' behaviour can be observed. Norm compliance is transmitted by
punishment, that is to say, an external force. This represents an advantage of Axelrod's modelling
strategy: The model provides a sound causal mechanism of norm spreading. Agents' adopt a norm
in fear of punishment. It provides an answer to the transformation and the transmission problem.
5.14
In fact, Axelrod's model has been the starting point for many models investigating normative
dynamics by applying a game theoretic mode of the problem description. The great advantage of
this account is to shed light on the process of norm change. As it has been become apparent in
discussing Mr Smith, this process can also be observed in human societies. However norm change
is only barely captured by the functional account of role theory.[8] It is, in fact, a theoretical
progress compared to the role theoretical approach.
5.15
On the other hand, the model only includes a restricted functional perspective: On an individual
level, the agents' choice of action is guided by the functional consideration of calculating the
expected utility. However, a corresponding analysis on the social macro-level cannot be found in
Axelrod's account. This first result can be summarised in the following table:




However, from the perspective of the role theory of action, a weakness of this approach becomes
apparent, one immediately related to the game theoretic problem description. Agents are faced
with a strategic (typically binary) decision situation. Thus, they have a fixed set of behaviour
(Moss 2001). Faced with this situation, agents choose the alternative that maximises their expected
utility. Behaviour change goes along not with goal change. Agents can do no more than react to
different environmental conditions. An active element of normative orientation in the choice
relating to the ends of action cannot be found in a game theoretic approach. This is simply due to
the fact that agents do not possess any internal mechanism to reflect and eventually change their
behaviour, other than the desire to maximise utility. This point has already been highlighted in
Parsons' critique of 'utilitarian theories' of action (Parsons 1937): namely, that the ends of
individual actions are in some way arbitrary. In Axelrod's model, this circumstance can be nicely
illustrated by the difference between the results of the norms game and the meta-norms game.
Even though agents quickly modify their behaviour, the ends of the action remain unchanged: the
goal is to maximise utility. In this respect, the relation between the action and the ends of the
action remains arbitrary.
5.17
However, the very idea of role theory is to provide an answer to the question: Where do ends come
from? Parsons' (and Durkheim's) answer was the internalisation of norms. A corresponding answer
to this problem is not supplied in Axelrod's model. This is due to the fact that agents do not act
because they want to obey (or deviate from) a norm. They do not 'know' norms. Their behaviour
can only be interpreted as normative from the perspective of an external observer. Thus,
transformation is not identical with internalisation. While the model provides a mechanism for
behaviour transformation, it cannot capture the process of internalisation. Compared to the
classical role theory, this is a principle limitation of a game theoretical description of the problem
situation.
2) Rosaria Conte, Cristiano Castelfranchi: Understanding the functions of norms in social
groups through simulation. In: Nigel Gilbert, Rosaria Conte (Eds.) Artificial Societies: the
computer simulation of social life. London, UCL Press, 1995
5.18
The starting point of this paper addresses considerations concerning what should be considered as
a norm: The paper differentiates between norms of co-ordination, which might be purely
conventional, and norms that include explicit prescriptions, directives, or commands. The latter
form the focus of this model. It investigates the functions performed by norms, in particular for the
control and reduction of aggression.
5.19
The simulations takes place on a 10 × 10 grid. This world contains 50 agents and 25 randomly
scattered 'food resources'. The agents are equipped with an initial 'strength' value of 20. Every
action is costly in terms of reducing the agents' strength value. The food items contain a nutritional
value of 40. Once consumed, this value is added to the agents' strength value. If a resource is
consumed, a new one appears at a random location.
5.20
The agents are able to perform the following actions: They can move one step per round. Each
move reduces the strength of the agent by 1. Agents are equipped with a visual field. Additionally,
they can observe their environment by so-called 'smelling'. This means that they can identify a
food resource, but cannot detect whether there is another agent between them and the 'smelled'food. If an agent occupies a cell which contains a food resource, it eats the food. This lasts for two
rounds. Finally, the agents are aggressive: if a neighbouring agent is eating food, they are able to
attack them. The result of the attack is dependent on the relative strength of the agents. An attack
reduces the strength of both agents by 4 units, no matter who is winning. Yet, the winner gains the
food.
5.21
Three kinds of experiments are undertaken:
1.  Blind aggression: the initial set-up contains no means to control aggression. Agents always
attack eaters when no other food is available. In particular, they do not take the agent's
strength into consideration. They will attack, even if they are weaker and bound to lose the
battle.
2.  Strategic aggression: this is a first step in aggression control. Aggression is constrained by
strategic reasoning. Strategic agents only attack those agents whose strength is not higher
than their own.
3.  Normative agents: in this setting, norm-based action control is introduced. Normative agents
do not always avoid aggression. Yet they obey a finder-keeper norm: the agent that initially
detects a resource is regarded as its possessor. Note, that multiple possession is allowed.
Possession is maintained over time, even when agents move away from their possession.
Normative agents do not attack agents eating their own food. Nevertheless, they can eat
possessed food from unoccupied cells. In this case they can be attacked by other agents.
5.22
The units of analysis pertaining to these experimental conditions are as follows: First, the rate of
aggression, that is, the number of attacks occurring during the simulation experiment, is stored.
Secondly, the average strength of the agents at the end of the simulation is recorded. At this level
of analysis, the strength of individual agents is interpreted as a measure of welfare. Finally, the
variance of the individual strength of agents is documented. This is interpreted as a measure of
equality. The greater the variance, the more unequal the agent society. The performance of the
three experimental conditions is then compared according to these three units of measurement.
5.23
The results are as follows:
1.  Degree of aggression: the experimental setting with agents blindly attacking each other
shows the highest degree of aggression. The strategic scenario has a considerably lower rate
of attacks. Thus, aggression can be controlled even with non-normative means. However, the
experimental condition of a normative agent society results in the lowest number of attacks.
2.  Aggregated welfare: inverse ordering can be observed for the welfare of societies: the 'blind
attack' society is the poorest, followed by the strategic agents' society. The normative agents'
society is the richest.
3.  Equality: with regard to the variance of strength it can be observed that the strategic scenario
exceeds the blind aggressive scenario to a small degree. Hence, the strategic agents' society
is the most unequal. The experiment with normative agents results in by far the most equal
distribution of welfare.
Conte and Castelfranchi's contribution to answering the questions:
5.24
This paper provides an example of how agent-based models are able to contribute to a functional
analysis of norms. The evaluation of welfare, equality or aggression control concerns the social
macro level. The paper shows that a norm of aggression control can be beneficial for a society as a
whole. However, in contrast to the classical scheme of functional explanations in the socialsciences, this result is reached by interactions of individual agents.
5.25
The classical scheme of a functional explanation assumes a social phenomena P, whereby P has a
(functional) effect n for the society. Individual actors have reasons to practise P independently of
the functional effect n. Moreover there is a feedback loop so that in the case of a decrease of P,
there is a cause for an amplification of P. Thus, society remains in equilibrium. It is claimed that
this state of affairs is crucial for the 'survival' of the society.
5.26
However, this explanation has often been criticised (compare e.g. Homans 1964; Haller 1999) for
failing to explain the primary existence of the social phenomena P and for the fact that the society
is assumed to be an unexplained 'social organism'. For instance, the explanation of a phenomenon
by reference to the survival of the society is regarded as a suspicious reification. The origin of the
societies needs is unexplained. The mere existence of a phenomenon indicates its necessary
character. However, the model proves that in principle it is also possible to undertake a functional
analysis on the basis of individual actors without reference to the needs of a social unit. Obviously,
the model does not include a process of self-regulation. The task of the model is much less
demanding. However, this avoids the danger of teleological explanations. Compared to the
classical role theory, this is in fact a theoretical progress.
5.27
Moreover, in this model a much stronger notion of norms is deployed than in Axelrod's model.
Norms are not just reached by mutual agreement, but are an explicit action routine. This
conception of norms allows for a wider field of applications that could cover the role theoretic
norm conception: these can be interpreted as internalised properties of the agents. However, the
process of internalisation is not investigated. Contrary to the concept of norms in Axelrod's model,
not even a mechanism for a normative transformation of the agents is given.
5.28
The model also shares a weakness of the role theoretic account in the social sciences: In particular,
norms are simply given in this model. The process of norm spreading is left unexplained. Neither a
transformation nor a transmission process can be discerned in the model. In this respect, the
criticism of functional explanations also holds for this model. These criticism go along with the
fact that agents cannot deliberate about norms and eventually deviate from them. Agents have no
individual freedom. As critics accuse the role theory, the action repertoire is also (depending on
conditions) deterministic. Thus, even though the authors succeed in 'bringing man back in', the
agents in the model are merely normative automata. Insofar as the norms are a pre-given element
in the model, the approach can also be regarded as an 'oversocialised' conception of man. The
result can be summarised in the following table:






Thus, from a role theoretical perspective, the strength of both models is complementary:On the one hand, Axelrod's model, employing a game theoretic mode of problem description,
provides a causal explanation for norm spreading. This includes a designation of mechanisms of
norm transmission and normative transformation. An investigation of the functional effect of
norms is left aside. Even though the model provides a mechanism for the transformation of the
agents, this is not identical with norm internalisation, which remains beyond the scope of this
account.
On the other hand, Conte and Castelfranchi's model, utilising cognitive agents in the AI tradition,
provides a causal explanation of how norms can have a functional effect on the social level.
However, the process of norm spreading is left unanalysed. The result can be summarised in the
following table:






The process of norm internalisation is beyond the scope of both models. While Axelrod's model
contains a process but no internalisation, the norms in Conte and Castelfranchi's model can be
interpreted as internalised but no mechanism is given. Hence, it is be plausible to assume that both
lines of research could benefit from each other. Such convergence could represent a step towards
the explanatory account of the classical role theory in terms of individual actors.
Further development
6.1
This section examines the extend to which research to date on normative agents has progressed
towards convergence. To this end, a sample of game theoretic models and models employing
cognitive agents will be investigated.
a) Models employing a game theoretic mode of speech:
Coleman, J. (1987) The emergence of norms in varying social structures. Angewandte
Sozialforschung, Vol. 14 (1) 17 - 30.
Coleman investigates the effect of interaction structures on the evolution of co-operation in
a prisoner's dilemma situation. Only small groups can prevent the exploitation of strangers.
Macy, M.; Sato, Y. (2002) Trust, cooperation, and market formation in the U.S. and Japan.
PNAS, Vol. 99, 7214 - 7220.
Macy/Sato examine the effect of mobility on the emergence of trust among strangers in a
trust game. While agents with low mobility trust only their neighbours, high mobility
supports the evolution of trust among strangers.
Vieth, M. (2003) Die Evolution von Fairnessnormen im Ultimatumspiel: eine
spieltheoretische Modellierung. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 32 (4) 346 - 367.Vieth investigates the evolution of fair division of a commodity in an ultimatum game.
Including the ability to signal emotions leads to a perfectly fair share. If detection of
emotions is costly the proposals even exceed fair share.
Bicchieri, C.; Duffy, J.; Tolle, G. (2003) Trust among strangers. Philosophy of Science, Vol.
71, 286 - 319.
Bicchieri et al. present a model of a trust game. It demonstrates how a trust and reciprocate
norm emerges in interactions among strangers. This is realised by several different
conditional strategies.
Savarimuthu, B.; Purvis, M.; Cranefield, S.; Purvis, M., (2007) How do norms emerge in
Multi-Agent Societies? Mechanism Design. The Information Science Discussion Paper
Series , 2007 (01).
Savarimuthu et al. study the convergence of different norms in the interactions of two
different societies. Both societies play an ultimatum game against each other. Two
mechanisms are examined: a normative advisor and a role model agent.
Sen, S.; Airiau, S. (2007) Emergence of norms through Social Learning. IJCAI-07, 1507 -
1512.
In this model, a co-ordination and a social dilemma game are examined. Agents learn norms
in repeated interactions with different agents. This is denoted as social learning to
distinguish this interaction type from repeated games with the same player. The whole
population converges to a consistent norm.
b) Models utilising cognitive agents:
Castelfranci, C.; Conte, R.; Paolucci, M. (1998) Normative Reputation and the costs of
compliance. JASSS, 1 (3) 3 http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/1/3/3.html.
This is an extension of the author's first model. The paper studies the interaction of different
agent populations. The interaction leads to a breakdown of the beneficent effects of norms,
which can only be preserved with the introduction of normative reputation and
communication among agents.
Saam, N.; Harrer, A. (1999) Simulating norms, social inequality, and functional change in
Artificial Societies. JASSS, 2 (1) 2 http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/2/1/2.html
Saam and Harrer present an extension of Conte and Castelfranci's model. They investigate
the influence of social inequality and power relations on the effectiveness of a 'finder-
keeper' norm.
Epstein, J. (2000) Learning to be thoughtless: Social norms and individual computation.
Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Papers, No. 6.
Epstein examines the effect of norms on both the social macro- and the individual micro
level. On the macro level, the model generates patterns of local conformity and global
diversity. At the level of the individual agents, norms have the effect of relieving agents
from individual thinking.
Flentge, F.; Polani, D.; Uthmann, T. (2001) Modelling the emergence of possession norms
using memes. JASSS, 4 (4) 3 http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/4/4/3.htmlFlentge et al. study the emergence and effects of a possession norm by processes of memetic
contagion. The norm is beneficent for the society, but has short-term disadvantages for
individual agents. Hence, the norm can only be retained in the presence of a sanctioning
norm.
Verhagen, H. (2001) Simulation of the Learning of Norms. Social Science Computer Review,
19 (3) 296 - 306.
Verhagen tries to obtain predictability of social systems while preserving autonomy on the
agent level through the introduction of norms. In the model, the degree of norm spreading
and internalisation is studied.
Hales, D. (2002) Group Reputation supports beneficent norms. JASSS, 5 (4) 4
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/4/4.html
Hales extends the Conte and Castelfranchi model by introducing stereotyping agents.
Reputation is projected not on individual agents but on whole groups. This works effectively
only when stereotyping is based on correct information. Even slight noise causes the norms
to breakdown.
Burke, M.; Fournier, G.; Prasad, K. (2006) The Emergence of Local Norms in Networks.
Complexity, 11 (5) 65 - 83.
Burke et al. investigate the emergence of a spatial distribution of a binary norm. Patterns of
local conformity and global diversity are generated by a decision process dependent on local
interaction with neighbouring agents.
6.2
Obviously, all these models have been developed for differing concrete purposes. To examine the
extend to which these models capture the explanatory problems of the contribution problem,
transformation problem and transmission problem, the various accounts of the different models
will be outlined in a table. Moreover, a short hint to the concrete implementation is provided.
Table 4: Tabular comparison



































































































































1 only in a second experiment
2 the agents are/are not already moral agents
6.3
The tabular description allows for a quick look at what progress has been made so far with regard
to the explanatory problems:
1.  Both traditions still predominantly contribute to a different focus of analysis. As can be seen
from the table, while all models in the game theoretic tradition investigate some form of
norm dynamics, most of the models in the AI tradition investigate functional aspects of
norms. There are exceptions such as the functional analysis of Savarimuthu et al., but here
degree of convergence is low.
2.  However, with regard to the transformation problem, the cognitive agents have become more
flexible than in the very first model of Conte and Castelfranchi. So far, a number of models
have implemented some mechanisms of agent transformation. However, a key difference
between both traditions still remains: while game theoretic models mainly concentrate on
some form of sanctioning as the transformation mechanism (Sen's model is an exception), in
models of cognitive agents a number of different accounts is used.[9]
3.  Obviously, the transformation has to be transmitted in some way. Thus, the transmission
problem is no longer a blind-spot of cognitive agents. By comparison, communication playsa much more important role, and is much more explicitly modelled in models with the AI
tradition. However, an investigation of the process of internalisation remains in the fledgling
stages.
4.  It is striking that social learning is implemented in many game theoretic models by a
replicator dynamics. If applied in a context where no real natural selection, rather than some
kind of learning, is at work, then using a replicator dynamics amounts to saying: Somehow
the individuals learn in a way that—measured by the relative overall success of their type of
behaviour—more successful types of behaviour become more frequent. As an effect this may
be true. However, no mechanism is indicated. In this dimension, the models struggle with
the same kind of problem as functional analysis which the individualistic program tries to
resolve; namely, the lack of a causal explanation.
6.4
It has become apparent that with regard to the transformation and the transmission problem, the
borderlines of both approaches are no longer so clear cut. To gain a more detailed insight into the
convergence of models, an example from both traditions has been selected for closer inspection:
The models of Verhagen (2001) and Savarimuthu et al. (2007). These models have been selected
since they represent the most advanced examples of models that incorporate elements from the
other tradition.
1) Harko Verhagen (2001) Simulation of the Learning of Norms. Social Science Computer
Review, Vol. 19
6.5
Verhagen investigates the problem of how to obtain predictability on the social level while
preserving autonomy at the level of individual agents. Therefore, norms are employed.
6.6
In the model, the agents are situated in a two dimensional grid landscape containing on each cell
either the resource A, the resource B, or nothing at all. The agents are clustered to a group with
one agent denoted as leader. Agents have the choice of either doing nothing, moving to another
cell, or of consuming either resource A or B. To decide which action to perform, the agents
calculate the expected pay-off in a decision tree. For every possible action, the utility of the action
is multiplied with the probability of success. The action with the highest score is chosen.
6.7
To integrate autonomous individual agents into a group, the agents have two decision trees: a
private decision tree, denoted as self-model, and a group decision tree, the group-model. The self-
model contains personal evaluations and the group-model represents what the agent presumes to
be group evaluations. The group-model is the agent's appreciation of group norms. Faced with a
decision situation, an agent combines both decision trees. The self-model is weighted with an
autonomy value a, the group-model is weighted with (1—a). The agent then announces its decision
to the group and executes the decision. Group members send the agent their own self-model
relating to the situation. After receiving n messages (n is the agent's memory length) the agent
updates its group-model. The feedback from the leader is weighted more strongly than those of
other agents. Also the self-model is updated in a manner that is dependent on the factual pay-off
gained by the executed action. This is denoted as feedback from the environment.
6.8
This framework is used to calculate the spreading and internalisation of norms. These variables
are used to investigate whether norms have the capability to induce predictability on the social
level, while preserving the agent's autonomy. For this reason several hypotheses are tested with
particular emphasis being placed on norm spreading and internalisation.[10] Norm internalisation is
calculated according to the sum of the differences between the self-model and the group-model ofall agents with regard to all action alternatives. With the self-model denoted as si, the agent's
group-model as gi, n action alternatives, and m agents, this reads as follows:
Σ(Σ |si – gi| / n) m (1)
6.9
Norm spreading is calculated according to the deviation of the sum of the personal group-models
of the individual agents from the mean group-model of all agents with regard to the number of
alternatives. With gi as the personal group model, g as the mean group model, n alternatives, and m
agents, this reads as follows:
(2)
Surprisingly, Verhagen claims, that a higher norm spreading indicates a higher variance of
behaviour.[11] Conversely, a higher variance of behaviour is defined as a lower degree of norm
internalisation.
Verhagen's contribution to answering the questions
6.10
The strength of the model lied in its high resolution of both inter- and intra-agent processes.
Contrary to the forerunner of the tradition of cognitive agents, the model of Conte and
Castelfranchi, it has a dynamic view on norms. Thus, it captures both the process of norm
transmission and agents' transformation, which is left aside in the classical model. While Conte
and Castelfranchi's agents are normative automata, a degree of autonomy is preserved in the agents
of this model. Traditionally, this represents the strength of the game theoretic tradition. However,
contrary to Axelrod's model—the forerunner of the game theoretic tradition—the model is
exceptional with regard to the problem of internalisation: it explicitly specifies a causal mechanism
of the process of internalisation.[12] It is thus, able to overcome the particular weak point of game
theoretic models: namely, that agents do not 'know' anything about the concept of norms. The
model constitutes a step towards convergence regarding the advantages of both approaches.
Moreover, via the notion of a leadership value, it also includes the effect of social differentiation
on normative dynamics.
6.11
In this respect, the model enables theoretical progress: it is highly advanced in constructing a
feedback loop between individual and collective dynamics. By the combination of the self- and the
group-model a representation of the (presumed) beliefs held in the society is integrated in the
belief system of individual agents. Conceptually, this is quite close to Mr Smith.
6.12
However, the implementation of internalisation is conducted on a rather ad hoc basis. The formula
calculates the difference between personal and (presumed) social values. This captures the idea of
internalisation. Yet in the formula the difference can vary from one time step to another. The
degree of internalisation can also diminish. This is in contrast to the socio-psychological
assumption that it is difficult to change norms once they are internalised. Internalised norms are
presumed to be tightly entrenched by processes in early childhood (Wallis and Poulton 2001).
Thus, the model is able to generate an effect which might look similar (but not identical) to
processes in human societies, but crucially it does not represent the processes at work. However, at
this point, the model reproduces a comparable weakness of the sociological account: Also classical
role theory paid more attention to the functional effects—that is, norm internalisation—than tocognitive mechanisms of the socialisation process.
6.13
Moreover, it has to be emphasised that—compared to the roles performed by Mr Smith—in this
model the norms are not particularly rich in content. In this respect, it is more a methodological
exercise. It does not contribute to an analysis of the function of norms. These are too weak in
content to reasonably examine their performance for the society. Therefore, and finally, another
model, from the game theoretic tradition is examined.
2) Bastin Savarimuthu, Maryam Purvis, Stephen Cranefield, Martin Purvis (2007) How do
Norms emerge in Multi-Agent Systems? Mechanism Design. The Information Science
Discussion Paper Series, No. 2007 / 1
6.14
This paper studies two mechanisms with regard how expectations converge. Shared expectations
are defined as norms. The models simulate the interaction of two agent societies with two different
norms. The assumption is that during the course of interaction the two different norms converge,
and moreover that this convergence improves the performance of the society.
6.15
To verify this assumption an Ultimatum game is set in motion. One player receives a certain
amount of a commodity under the condition that it proposes a part of it to another player. The
proposal can vary between 0 and 100% of the whole amount. The other player has two options: to
accept or reject the proposal. If it rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. The agents play
the game against all members of the other society. The two societies differ in their principles of
proposal and rejection. Society 1 is denoted as selfish, society 2 as benevolent. Agents of the
selfish society try to maximise their utility. They propose the least amount of money while
accepting every amount apart from 0. This is consistent with Rational Choice assumptions.
Benevolent agents, on the other hand, propose more than a fair share, but reject every proposal
above a fair share. The values of proposal and acceptance are the norms under investigation.
6.16
In the first mechanism proposed, the agents have two possibilities to obtain a specific norm: they
can follow a group norm (G norm) or a personal norm (P norm). Both norms continuously evolve
based on social learning. While the G norm is shared by all members of the society, the P norm is
specific to individual agents. The probability that they choose either the G norm or the P norm is
calculated according to an autonomy value (between 0 and 1) of the agents. The G norm of each
society is calculated by a so-called normative advisor agent: at the end of each round of the game,
all agents from each society submit their successful proposal and acceptance values to their
normative advisor agent. The average successful value is then used by the normative advisor agent
to update the G norm of the society. The P norm is updated by each agent itself, dependent on its
success.
6.17
In the second mechanism, instead of a normative advisor agent, a role model agent is introduced.
The agents dispose only of a P norm. However, agents can decide to ask the role model agent for
advice. If they ask for advice, they can decide if they follow the advice or not. Both decisions are
based on the autonomy value of the agent. The role model agent calculates advice in the same way
as the normative advisor agent updates the G norms.
6.18
The questions under investigation relate to the average performance of the societies in different
settings and ask whether the proposal norms stabilise on a commonly shared value. Three
experiments are undertaken: an initial experiment with societies that do not change initial norms,followed by experiments with both mechanisms.
6.19
Societies that resist change return the worst performance. Obviously, the norms of the two societies
do not converge in this case. However, norms do converge if either mechanisms one or two is
applied. In the long run, the average score in both cases is near to a utopian society of a perfectly
fair share. However, convergence time is faster when mechanism one is applied. The authors
ascribe this result to the fact that mechanism two does not possess the concept of a G norm.[13]
Savarimuthu's contribution to answering the questions:
6.20
As usual in game theoretic models, the model provides an answer to the transmission and
transformation problem. Moreover, this model explicitly addresses the question of the performance
of norms for the society. It contributes to a functional analysis. This is only rarely observed in
models within the game theoretic tradition. Moreover, by the notion of a normative advisor or role
model agent, social norms are explicitly represented in the model. It thus represents an important
step to integrate the perspective of the cognitive tradition in a game theoretical framework.
6.21
However, the price the authors have to pay is that this model also shares a weakness of classical
sociological accounts. Consider the normative advisor and role model agent: they are both crucial
for the model's results, since they possess global knowledge of all successful proposal values in
their society. Their knowledge exceeds that of any individual agent. In fact, a role model is a well
known concept in social science, but the traditional concept of a role model is based on the notion
of prestige and status in peer groups. This is very different from the implementation in this model.
6.22
What is missing is a justification of these agents: what is their epistemological status apart from
the purely computational level? The notion of normative advisor or role model agent is in danger
of intermixing a target system with a computational trick. Such effect generating modelling is
particularly suspicious because it is not only a modelling shortcut to generate effects assumed to be
generated by processes that are at work in reality, but are not explicitly modelled. In fact, no such
processes are specified by the authors. Considered as a real world entity, the normative advisor or
role model agent would equate to an omniscient central bureaucracy. This, of course, is very
unlikely. They can be suspected of representing a reification of society. Hence, it turns out that the
model is faced with the same objections that already have been raised against functional
explanations—in particular from the perspective of methodological individualism.
Conclusion
7.1
An examination of normative agent-based social simulation models raises many questions, not all
of which can be answered in a single paper. In particular, the following two questions have not
been addressed:
1.  The concrete content of specific norms has not been considered. The circumstances that the
models examined in this paper originate in highly diverse research fields, is reflected in the
different nature of the norms used in the models. Many of the game theoretic models
investigate the emergence of norms centred on trust and reciprocation. However, it would
call for ethnographic studies and participatory modelling methods to determine what the
essential norms of human societies to be replicated in computer models actually are.
2.  Moreover, an examination of the concrete mechanisms at work in the diverse modelsgenerating specific effects has not been undertaken. Presumably, it would be possible to
assemble typical model structures resulting in typical effects. For instance, in two models
(Epstein's model and the model of Burke et al.) an effect of local conformity and global
diversity has been generated. In both models, this result is caused by local interactions.
However, it is left for future work to provide a comprehensive overview.
7.2
The focus of this article was first to detect the methodological requirements for agents to compare
agent-based models with role theoretical arguments and findings. This approach has been guided
by the claim of agent-based modelling to 'discovering the language in which the great book of
social reality is written'. The finding that norms regulate a good deal of social interaction remains
beyond dispute. Thus, to finally achieve this ambitious goal, it is essential to gain a proper
understanding of the structure of normative influence by the means of the actor oriented approach
of agent-based modelling. This report has accomplished an identification of three fundamental
methodological tasks that normative multi-agent systems need to fulfil for this purpose:
in some way a transmission of norms has to be ensured by the model. To regulate social
interaction norms have to possess a certain degree of generality. If norms are not assumed to
be pre-given, it has to be explained how they spread in a society.
The process of norm transmission implies that in some way a transformation of the agents
must be possible. The transformation problem can be further subdivided into strategic
adaptation to, and the internalisation of norms.
Finally, it is an advantage if an analysis of norms at work can include the function of norms
in some way. Such an inclusion allows the investigation of a broader range of research
questions.
7.3
Secondly, the extend to which these requirements are fulfilled by the existing agent-based
simulation models of norms has been assessed. Existing models originate primarily in two
different traditions: Game theory and Artificial Intelligence. The first models of Axelrod (game
theoretic tradition) and Conte and Castelfranchi (AI tradition) could only partially fulfil these
requirements, failing in other aspects:
7.4
Axelrod's model is effective at explaining the dynamics of norms, in particular the strategic
adaptation of agents to changing environmental conditions. Namely, they react to punishment.
Thus, there exist a mechanism for norm transmission and agent transformation. In contrast to
classical sociological accounts it lacks of an active element of normative orientation in the choice
of the ends of action. The agents do not 'know' norms. Thus, the models does not capture the
process of norm internalisation. Also a functional analysis is not in the scope of the model.
7.5
On the other hand, Conte and Castelfranchi's model primarily demonstrates the effects of norms.
Moreover, it includes norms that exceed strategic adaptation. Norms can be interpreted as an
internalised property. However, this is also the weak point of the model: the agents are merely
normative automata. No mechanisms for the transmission and transformation problem are given.
7.6
The further development shows a convergence of both traditions. The models of Verhagen and
Savarimuthu et al. include elements of the other line of thought. This enables (partial) answers to
the questions of transmission, transformation and contribution. However, the review shows also
how difficult it is to implement the requirements: While Verhagen's model is able to generate the
effect of internalisation, but does not represent the process of internalisation, in Savarimuthu's
model there is not even a process indicated which could generate the effects of normative advisor
or role model agents. This suggests a suspicion of reification. In this respect, both models alsoreplicate not only the findings, but also the shortcomings of classical role theory. There is, then,
still a lot to do with regard to achieving a comprehensive understanding of how actors produce,
and are at the same time a product of social reality.
7.7
In conclusion, future work could profit from a finer-grained resolution of internal processes of
normative reasoning based on explicit representations of norms. While agent-based modelling has
reached a substantial understanding of inter-agent processes, an investigation of the recursive
impact of inter- and intra-agent processes is still in its fledgling stages.
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 Notes
1It is often denoted as 'variable sociology'—with a critical undertone. The empirical counterpart of
role theory is the statistical analysis of relations between variables. A criticism has been levelled
that already in the process of drawing a representative sample, individual actors are neglected.
However, the relations between variables do not provide a causal explanation (Esser 1987;
Faulbaum 1992). It is claimed that its partial success has been only accidental: since in the 20th
century the ties between social origins (for instance Catholicism or working-class) and specific
attitudes (e.g. towards the pope) had been very strong. Therefore such interconnections could
appear in statistical samples, even if they do not provide a causal generative mechanism. However,
it is claimed that in course of the process of individualisation since the 1980s these ties have been
lost and these 'artificial' relations have vanished (Esser 1989, 1996).
2Beside the fundamental paradigm shift towards methodological individualism, Parsons has also
been criticised for inherent inconsistencies (compare Balog 2000; Haller 1999; Oakes 1980;
Warner 1978; Gouldner 1971; Black 1961). This judgement is emphasised also by evidence from
attempts to model Parsons' theory (Jacobsen and Bronson 1997).
3This is in remarkable contrast to Parsons original intention: in fact, he criticised 'utilitarian'
theories as deterministic. He claimed that the active role of an actor is “reduced to one of the
understanding of his situation and forecasting of its future course of development” (Parsons 1937
[1968], p. 64). Thus, the actor is reduced to a situational automaton. Parsons claimed that a
'voluntaristic' theory of action has to include the active choice of the ends of action. However, in
explaining these ends, he relied on the pre-existence of social norms and in so doing reduced the
individual actor again to the status of an automaton. Normative orientation is identified with
conformity with norms. This is in contradiction to his own approach.
4 For this reason, the work of Brian Skyrms, for instance, is not included. Without a doubt, the
evolution of the social contract (Skyrms 1996) is a highly relevant question for the foundation of
social norms. However, Skyrms' models remain on the level of population dynamics. Intra agent
processes are not taken into regard. The results of the models may be true, but the mechanismscannot be covered by such an approach. Here we will concentrate on models including in some
way intra-agent processes.
5A Replication of a simulation model developed by Robert Axelrod undertaken by Galan and
Izquierdo (2005) use analytical tools as well as simulation experiments.
6 For an overview of the broad range of moral dynamics compare Hegselmann (2008). A
representative sample of normative architectures is examined by Neumann (2008).
7Yet Galan and Izquierdo (2005) prove that the results are not unequivocal.
8The criticism has been levelled that too much attention has been paid to the concept of a an
equilibrium (Merton 1957; Gouldner 1971). This shortcoming is closely related to functional
explanations. If a deviation exist from the equilibrium, it is assumed that forces also exist that push
the social system into a state of equilibrium again.
9Even though in the models in the AI tradition often punishment is possible, punishment does not
induce a transformation of the punished agent.
10The hypotheses are first, that a higher degree of autonomy reduces the predictability of the
behaviour. Secondly, that a higher leadership value induces a higher predictability of the
behaviour. Thirdly, if the personal decision tree equals the initial group decision tree, it is assumed
that the predictability will be higher compared to an initial random group decision tree. In fact, a
higher autonomy value leads to a higher degree of norm spreading. Surprisingly, a higher
autonomy does not lead to a lower norm internalisation—which indicates (according to Verhagen's
assumptions) a higher variance of behaviour. Thus, the Hypothesis is rejected for norm
internalisation. The same result holds for the effect of the leadership value: A higher leadership
value leads to a higher norm spreading but not to a higher degree of norm internalisation. Only the
final assumption is verified for both norm spreading and internalisation.
11Presumably, the assumption is that higher norm spreading indicates a higher difference between
the agent's self- and the group-model. However, no reference to the self-model is given in the
formula.
12 A similar concept can also be found in the model of Saam and Harrer (1999). The authors
deploy the notion of institutionalisation of norms in a society as a whole. Institutionalisation of a
norm n means that n is saved in the memory of each agent of the society. Thus, a norm is
institutionalised, if it is internalised in each agent of the society. While internalisation refers to the
micro-level of individual agents, institutionalisation is a concept that operates on the social macro-
level. However, in Saam and Harrer's model, institutionalisation is simply switched on (or off) by a
so-called redistribution agent. There is no mechanism at work that could explain the transmission
of a norm to individual agents.
13The slower convergence time might be due to the fact that in the case of mechanism two the
autonomy value is applied twice: for determining the probability that agents ask for advice, and
again for the probability that they accept it.
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